

27 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Robert R. Bowie
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence

SUBJECT : Memorandum on What Are the Soviets Up To in Berlin?

1. Action Requested: The attached memorandum should be presented to the President.

2. Background. This memorandum analyzes Soviet objectives in demanding the reduction and eventual cessation of allied military patrols in East Berlin. It estimates that, after the allies reject this demarche (as we understand they will), the Soviets will not let the issue die. It presents two possible Soviet courses of action. The more likely one is that the Soviets will move gradually in building pressure on the West. The more far-reaching possibility is that the USSR, concerned to demonstrate its displeasure with the recent course of US-Soviet relations and its ability to exact a price, will press harder and earlier on Western vulnerabilities in the Berlin area. An annex addresses evidence of current military activity and concludes that it is probably not related to the patrols issue.

3. The text of the allied response to the Soviet demarche is now being negotiated with the French and British. Coordination and delivery will probably take another week.

4. This analysis was drafted by CIA/ORPA and coordinated with other DDI elements and the Strategic Warning Staff under the guidance of the National Intelligence Officer for USSR and Eastern Europe.

25X1


5. Recommendation. I recommend that you deliver this analysis to the President and assure him that we are carefully monitoring political and military developments of possible relevance to this issue.



Robert R. Bowie

25X1

Attachment



Copy # 1

25X1

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP79R00603A002400160001-1

26 April 1977

SUBJECT: Memorandum on What Are The Soviets Up To in Berlin?

Distribution:

- cy. 1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - SA/DCI/ [redacted]
4 - Exec. Reg.
5 - D/DCI/NI
6 - AD/DCI/NI
7-8 - NIO/USSR
9 - NIO/WE
10 - NIO/CF
11 - NIO/RI
12 - [redacted]
13 - DDI
14 - CPS/George Allen/Bob Gates
15 - Berlin Working Group [redacted]
16 - DC/ORP [redacted]
17 - ORPA/U [redacted]
18 - ORPA/E [redacted]
19 - ORPA/W [redacted]
20 - D/OSR
21 - OSR/RA [redacted]
22 - DDO
23 - C/EUR
24 - EUR/Reports
25 - C/SE
26 - SE/RR
27 - D/DCI/IC
28 - DCI

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP79R00603A002400160001-1

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP79R00603A002400160001-1

[REDACTED]
Copy No. 11
26 April 1977

25X1

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: What are the Soviets Up To in Berlin

1. There has been considerable concern in the intelligence community over the Soviet demarche of April 15 that the allied patrols in East Berlin be gradually abolished. It can be seen as merely another step in a gradual and long-term effort to whittle away at the Western presence in both parts of Berlin. Beyond this, however, it may mark a significant escalation of this process directly related to Soviet dissatisfaction with the Carter administration's policy toward the USSR.

The East German Problem

25X1 2. We know [REDACTED] that the East Germans began pressuring the Soviets last summer for permission to take steps that would underline the independence and the sovereignty of the GDR. The East German leaders evidently thought that making manifest the sovereignty of the GDR and particularly East Berlin as its capital would help give the lie to West German pretensions regarding "one Germany" and would ease the building internal pressure for free travel and emigration to the West. The East Germans were reacting to what they regarded as West Germany's increased assertiveness on West Berlin and heightened propaganda directed at the East German people. The GDR clearly was fearful of the destabilizing effect on the East German people, manifested by the increased number of East Germans applying for emigration to the West. It was in this context that Ambassador Dobrynin raised orally with Secretary Kissinger last June the question of the allied flag tours in East Berlin.

3. The Soviets and the East Germans decided not to push these steps until after the West German and US elections. Moscow, in particular, did not want to jeopardize Schmidt's election. With the elections out of the way, the East Germans, with Moscow's concurrence, took steps in the winter to tighten requirements for entry from the West and to remove some of the few remaining symbols of the unique status of East Berlin.

Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP79R00603A002400160001-1

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP79R00603A002400160001-1

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP79R00603A002400160001-1